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Abstract— This paper introduces a novel payoff-based learn-
ing scheme for distributed optimization in repeatedly-played
strategic-form games. Standard reinforcement-based learning
schemes exhibit several limitations with respect to their asymp-
totic stability. For example, in two-player coordination games,
payoff-dominant (or efficient) Nash equilibria may not be
stochastically stable. In this work, we present an extension
of perturbed learning automata, namely aspiration-based per-
turbed learning automata (APLA) that overcomes these limi-
tations. We provide a stochastic stability analysis of APLA in
multi-player coordination games. We further show that payoff-
dominant Nash equilibria are the only stochastically stable
states.
I. INTRODUCTION
Multi-agent formulations can be used to tackle distributed
optimization problems due to their reduced communication
and computational complexity. In such formulations, agents
make their own decisions repeatedly over time trying to
maximize their own utility/performance function. However,
due to the interdependencies among agents’ utility functions,
local (or distributed) optimization does not necessarily imply
global (or centralized) optimization. The problem becomes
even more challenging when the utility function of each
agent is unknown, and only measurements of this function
(possibly corrupted by noise) are available. For this reason,
there have been several efforts towards the design of dis-
tributed payoff-based learning dynamics for convergence to
globally optimal outcomes.
Naturally, several such distributed optimization problems
can be formulated as strategic-form games. A rather com-
mon objective is then to derive conditions under which
convergence to efficient Nash equilibria can be achieved,
i.e., locally stable outcomes that also maximize a centralized
objective. One large class of payoff-based learning dynamics
that has been utilized for convergence to Nash equilibria is
reinforcement-based learning. It may appear under alterna-
tive forms, including discrete-time replicator dynamics [1],
learning automata [2], [3] or approximate policy iteration or
Q-learning [4]. It is highly attractive to several engineering
applications, since agents do not need to know neither the
actions of other agents, nor their own utility function. For
example, it has been utilized for system identification and
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pattern recognition [5], distributed network formation and
resource-allocation problems [6].
In reinforcement-based learning, deriving conditions for
convergence to Nash equilibria may not be a trivial task
especially in the case of large number of agents. Especially
in the context of coordination games (e.g., [7]), two main
difficulties are encountered: a) excluding convergence to pure
strategies that are not Nash equilibria, and b) excluding
convergence to mixed strategy profiles. Recent work by
the author in perturbed learning automata [8], overcame
these limitations by directly characterizing the stochastically
stable states of the induced Markov chain (independently
of the number of players or actions). This type of analy-
sis allowed for acquiring convergence guarantees in multi-
player coordination games (thus, extending previous results
in reinforcement-based learning restricted only to potential
games).
Although Nash equilibria are stochastically stable in co-
ordination games under perturbed learning automata, not all
Nash equilibria may be desirable. An example may be drawn
from the classical Stag-Hunt coordination game of Table I.
In this game, the first player selects the row of the payoff
TABLE I
THE STAG-HUNT GAME
A B
A 5, 5 1, 3
B 3, 1 4, 4
matrix and the second player selects the column. The first
element of the selected entry determines the reward of the
row player, and the second element determines the reward of
the column player. This game has two pure Nash equilibria,
which correspond to the symmetric plays (A,A) and (B,B).
Ideally, we would prefer that agents eventually learn to play
(A,A) which corresponds to the payoff-dominant (or Pareto-
efficient) equilibrium. However, existing results in perturbed
learning automata [6], [9], [8] demonstrate that (B,B) may
prevail asymptotically with positive probability. The reason
lies in the cost that an agent experiences when the other
agent deviates from a Nash equilibrium, which captures the
notion of risk dominance (cf., [10]). In fact, (B,B) is the
risk-dominant equilibrium in the Stag-Hunt game of Table I.
In the present paper, we extend the perturbed learning
automata dynamics presented in [8] to incorporate agents’
satisfaction levels, namely aspiration-based perturbed learn-
ing automata (APLA). In this extended version, an agent
reinforces an action based on both repeated selection and
its satisfaction level. We provide a stochastically stability
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analysis of the proposed dynamics in multi-player coordi-
nation games. Furthermore, we show that payoff-dominant
Nash equilibria are the only stochastically-stable states, as
opposed to standard learning automata.
This paper (also in combination with [8]) provides an
analytical framework that significantly expands the utility of
reinforcement-based learning in strategic-form games. Note
though that several classes of aspiration-based learning also
guarantee convergence to efficient outcomes in coordination
games. For example, the baseline-based dynamics of [11],
the mode-based dynamics of [12], the trial-and-error dynam-
ics of [13], and the aspiration-learning dynamics of [7] also
guarantee convergence to efficient Nash equilibria in certain
classes of coordination and weakly-acyclic games. However,
existing analysis does not take into account the possibility of
noisy observations (with the exception of [11] and through
the introduction of sufficiently large exploration phases). In
comparison with these learning dynamics, learning automata
can naturally incorporate noisy observations, as demonstrated
in the robustness convergence analysis of [14], due to the
indirect filtering of measurement noise in the formulation of
the agents’ strategies.
In the remainder of the paper, Section II introduces co-
ordination games and Section III presents the aspiration-
based perturbed learning automata dynamics. Section IV
presents the main weak-convergence result and Section V
its technical derivation. Section VI provides a refinement of
stochastically stable states together with a simulation study.
Finally, Section VII presents concluding remarks.
Notation:
− For a Euclidean topological space, |·| denotes the
Euclidean distance.
− ej denotes the unit vector in Rn where its jth entry is
equal to 1 and all other entries is equal to 0.
− ∆(n) denotes the probability simplex of dimension n,
i.e., ∆(n) .=
{
x ∈ Rn : x ≥ 0,1Tx = 1} .
− δx denotes the Dirac measure at x.
− For a finite set A, |A| denotes its cardinality.
− Let σ ∈ ∆(|A|) be a finite probability distribution for
some finite set A. The random selection of an element
of A will be denoted randσ[A]. If σ = (1/|A|, ..., 1/|A|),
i.e., it corresponds to the uniform distribution, the
random selection will be denoted by randunif [A].
II. COORDINATION GAMES
We consider the standard setup of finite strategic-form
games. There is a finite set of agents or players, I =
{1, 2, . . . , n}, and each agent has a finite set of actions,
denoted by Ai. The set of action profiles is the Cartesian
product A .= A1 × · · · × An; αi ∈ Ai denotes an action of
agent i; and α = (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ A denotes the action profile
or joint action of all agents. The payoff/utility function of
player i is a mapping ui : A → R. An action profile α∗ ∈ A
is a (pure) Nash equilibrium if, for each i ∈ I,
ui(α
∗
i , α
∗
−i) ≥ ui(α′i, α∗−i) (1)
for all α′i ∈ Ai, where −i denotes the complementary set
I \ {i}. We denote the set of pure Nash equilibria by A∗.
Before defining coordination games, we first need to define
the notion of best response.
Definition 2.1 (Best Response): The best response of
agent i ∈ I to an action profile α = (αi, α−i) ∈ A is a
set valued map BRi : A → 2Ai such that
BRi(α)
.
= arg max
a∈Ai
ui(a, α−i).
A coordination game is defined as follows:
Definition 2.2 (Coordination game): A game of two or
more agents is a coordination game if the following con-
ditions are satisfied:
(a) for any α ∈ A \ A∗, there exist i ∈ I and action
α′i ∈ BRi(α) such that
uj(α
′
i, α−i) ≥ uj(αi, α−i) , for all j 6= i ; (2)
(b) for any α∗ ∈ A∗, there exist an agent i and an action
α˜i ∈ Ai such that
uj(α˜i, α
∗
−i) < uj(α
∗) , for all j ∈ I . (3)
The conditions of a coordination game establish a weak
form of “coincidence of interests” among players. For ex-
ample, condition (2) states that there always exists a best
response of a player that can make no other player worse
off. Due to this condition, a pure Nash equilibrium always
exists. Furthermore, condition (3) states that at a pure Nash
equilibrium, there exists an action profile that can make
every player worse off. It is straightforward to show that
coordination games are weakly acyclic games (cf., [15]). For
example, the Stag-Hunt game of Table I satisfy the properties
of Definition 2.2. Alternative examples can be found, e.g., the
network formation games and common-pool games presented
in [7].
For the remainder of the paper, we will be concerned
with coordination games that satisfy the Positive-Utility
Property.
Property 2.1 (Positive-Utility Property): For any agent
i ∈ I and any action profile α ∈ A, ui(α) > 0.
III. ASPIRATION-BASED PERTURBED LEARNING
AUTOMATA (APLA)
In this section, we present a novel reinforcement-
based learning algorithm, namely aspiration-based perturbed
learning automata (APLA).
The proposed dynamics is presented in Table II and
extends the recently developed perturbed learning automata
[6], [8]. At the first step, each agent i selects an action
according to a finite probability distribution (i.e., strategy)
xi(t) ∈ Xi .= ∆(|Ai|) (capturing its beliefs about the most
rewarding action). Its selection is slightly perturbed by a
perturbation (or mutations) factor λ > 0, such that, with
a small probability λ agent i follows a uniform strategy
(or, it trembles). At the second step, agent i evaluates its
new selection by collecting a utility measurement, while in
the third step, agent i updates its strategy vector given its
new experience. Finally, each agent i updates its discounted
TABLE II
ASPIRATION-BASED PERTURBED LEARNING AUTOMATA (APLA)
At fixed time instances t = 1, 2, ..., and for each agent i ∈ I, the following
steps are executed recursively. Let αi(t) and xi(t) denote the current action
and strategy of agent i, respectively.
1) (action update) Agent i ∈ I selects a new action αi(t + 1) as
follows:
αi(t+ 1) =
{
randxi(t)[Ai], with probability 1− λ,
randunif [Ai], with probability λ,
(4)
for some small perturbation factor λ > 0.
2) (evaluation) Agent i applies its new action αi(t+ 1) and receives
a measurement of its utility function ui(α(t+ 1)) > 0.
3) (strategy update) Agent i revises its strategy vector xi ∈ ∆(|Ai|)
as follows:
xi(t+ 1) = xi(t) +  · ui(α(t+ 1)) · [eαi(t+1) − xi(t)]·
φ(ui(α(t+ 1))− ρi(t)).
= Ri(α(t+ 1), xi(t), ρi(t)), (5)
for some constant step size  > 0, where
φ(y)
.
=
{
1 , if y ≥ 0 ,
max(h, 1 + y/h) , if y < 0 .
(6)
for some positive constant h > 0.
4) (aspiration-level update) Agent i revises its aspiration level ρi ∈
[ρ, ρ] as follows:
ρi(t+ 1) = ρi(t) + ν · [ui(α(t+ 1))− ρi(t)].
= Ki(α(t+ 1), ρi(t)). (7)
for some constant step size ν > 0.
running average performance, namely aspiration level, ρi ∈
[ρ, ρ], for some ρ, ρ > 0.
Here we identify actions Ai with vertices of the simplex,
{e1, ..., e|Ai|}. For example, if agent i selects its jth action at
time t, then eαi(t) ≡ ej . To better clarify how the strategies
evolve, consider the following toy example. Let the current
strategy of player i be xi(t) = ( 1/2 1/2 )T, i.e., player
i has two actions, each assigned probability 1/2. Let also
αi(t+ 1) = 1, i.e., player i selects the first action according
to rule (4). Then, the new strategy vector for agent i, updated
according to rule (5), is:
xi(t+ 1) =
1/2
(
1 +  · ui(α(t+ 1)) · φ(ui(α(t+ 1))− ρi(t))
1−  · ui(α(t+ 1)) · φ(ui(α(t+ 1))− ρi(t))
)
.
If y .= ui(α(t + 1)) − ρi(t) ≥ 0, i.e., player i receives a
satisfactory performance, then φ(y) = 1, and the strategy
of the selected action is going to increase proportionally to
the reward received from this action. If, instead, y < 0, then
φ(y) = max{h, 1+y/h} < 1, and the strategy of the selected
action is going to increase proportionally to both the reward
received and φ(y). By adjusting h > 0, we may control the
increase in the strategy of a dissatisfactory action, since, if
the current reward is far below the current aspiration level,
then φ(y) = h.
The introduction of the level of satisfaction captured by
φ(·) in the strategy update is the main contribution of
this paper as compared to the original perturbed learning
automata (PLA) introduced in [6], [8], where h ≡ 1.
Note that by letting the step-size  to be sufficiently small
and since the utility function ui(·) is uniformly bounded in
A, xi(t) ∈ ∆(|Ai|) for all t.
We also deliberately set the step size of the aspiration-
level update ν > 0 to be different than the step size of the
strategy vector update  > 0. In general, and for reasons that
will become more clear in the forthcoming Section V, we
would like ν to be sufficiently larger than  in order for the
aspiration level to evolve at a faster rate than the strategy
vector. For the remainder of the paper, we will assume the
following design property.
Property 3.1: Given  > 0, we set the step size ν = ν()
sufficiently small such that, for any δ > 0,
sup
i∈I
log
(
δ/
∣∣ρ− ρ∣∣)
log(1− ν) ≤ infα∈A infi∈I
log(δ)
log(1− ui(α)) (8)
The ratio of the l.h.s. represents the minimum number of
steps that the aspiration-level update of a player i needs to
reach a δ-neighborhood of the utility ui(α) starting from
any other action profile. The ratio of the r.h.s. represents the
minimum number of steps that the strategy update of a player
i needs to reach a δ-neighborhood of the pure strategy vector
corresponding to α, when playing α continuously. It is clear
that for a finite number of actions and bounded utilities, and
for ν sufficiently larger than , property (8) will be satisfied.
IV. STOCHASTIC STABILITY
A. Terminology and notation
Let Z .= A×X ×W , where X .= X1× . . .×Xn andW .=
[ρ, ρ]n, i.e., tuples of joint actions α, strategy profiles x =
(x1, ..., xn) and aspiration-level profiles ρ = (ρ1, ..., ρn). We
will denote the elements of the state space Z by z.
The set A is endowed with the discrete topology, X
and W with the usual Euclidean topology, and Z with the
corresponding product topology. We also let B(Z) denote
the Borel σ-field of Z , and P(Z) the set of probability
measures (p.m.) on B(Z) endowed with the Prohorov topol-
ogy, i.e., the topology of weak convergence. The dynamics
of Table II defines an Z-valued Markov chain. Let Pλ :
Z ×B(Z)→ [0, 1] denote its transition probability function
(t.p.f.), parameterized by λ > 0. We will refer to this process
as the perturbed process.
Note that under the perturbed process Pλ one or more
agents may tremble (i.e., select randomly an action according
to the uniform distribution). Define also the process P : Z×
B(Z) → [0, 1] where at most one agent may tremble. We
will refer to this process as the unperturbed process.
We let Cb(Z) denote the Banach space of real-valued
continuous functions on Z under the sup-norm (denoted by
‖ · ‖∞) topology. For f ∈ Cb(Z), define
Pλf(z)
.
=
∫
Z
Pλ(z, dy)f(y),
and
µ[f ]
.
=
∫
Z
µ(dz)f(z), for µ ∈ P(Z).
The process governed by the unperturbed process P will
be denoted by Z = {Zt : t ≥ 0}. Let Ω .= Z∞ denote
the canonical path space, i.e., an element ω ∈ Ω is a
sequence {ω(0), ω(1), . . . }, with ω(t) = (α(t), x(t), ρ(t)) ∈
Z . We use the same notation for the elements (α, x, ρ)
of the space Z and for the coordinates of the process
Zt = (α(t), x(t), ρ(t)). Let also Pz[·] denote the unique p.m.
induced by the unperturbed process P on the product σ-field
of Z∞, initialized at z = (α, x, ρ).
B. Stochastic stability
First, note that both P and Pλ (λ, h > 0) satisfy the weak-
Feller property (cf., [16, Definition 4.4.2]).
Proposition 4.1: Both the unperturbed process P (λ = 0)
and the perturbed process Pλ (λ > 0) satisfy the weak-Feller
property.
Proof: Let us consider the perturbed process Pλ. The
proof for the unperturbed process will be directly implied by
employing λ = 0. Let us also consider any sequence {z(k) =
(α(k), x(k), ρ(k))} such that z(k) → z = (α, x, ρ) ∈ Z .
For any open set O ∈ B(Z), the following holds:
Pλ(z
(k) = (α(k), x(k), ρ(k)), O)
=
∑
α∈PA(O)
{∏
i∈I
x˜
(k)
iαi
·∏
i∈I
Pz(k)
[
Ri(α, x(k)i , ρ(k)i ) ∈ PXi(O)
]
·∏
i∈I
Pz(k)
[
Ki(α, ρ(k)i ) ∈ PWi(O)
]}
=
∑
α∈PA(O)
{ n∏
i=1
{
IPXi (O)
(
Ri(α, x(k)i , ρ(k)i )
)
·
IPWi (O)
(
Ki(α, ρ(k)i )
)
· x˜(k)iαi
}}
,
where PXi(O), PA(O) and PWi(O) are the canonical
projections defined by the product topology, and
x˜
(k)
iαi
.
= (1− λ)x(k)iαi + λ/|Ai|.
Similarly, we have:
Pλ(z,O)
=
∑
α∈PA(O)
{ n∏
i=1
{
IPXi (O) (Ri (α, xi, ρi)) ·
IPXi (O) (Ri (α, xi, ρi)) · x˜iαi
}
.
To investigate the limit of Pλ(Z(k), O) as k → ∞, it
suffices to investigate the behavior of the sequences
β
(k)
i
.
= IPXi (O)
(
Ri(α, x(k)i , ρ(k)i
)
,
and
γ
(k)
i
.
= IPWi (O)
(
Ki(α, ρ(k)i
)
.
Let us first investigate the sequence β(k)i . We distinguish
the following (complementary) cases:
(a) Ri(α, xi, ρi) /∈ PXi(O) and Ri(α, xi, ρi) /∈ ∂PXi(O):
In this case, there exists an open ball about the next
strategy vector that does not share any common points
with the canonical projection of O. Due to the continuity
of the function Ri(α, ·, ·), we have that β(k)i → βi .=
IPXi (O)(Ri(α, xi, ρi)) ≡ 0.
(b) Ri(α, xi, ρi) ∈ PXi(O): In this case, there exists an
open ball about the next strategy vector that belongs to the
canonical projection of O, since O ∈ B(Z). Due to the
continuity of the function Ri(α, ·, ·) with respect to both the
strategy xi and the aspiration level ρi, we have that β
(k)
i →
βi = 1.
(c) Ri(α, xi, ρi) /∈ PXi(O) and Ri(α, xi, ρi) ∈ ∂PXi(O):
In this case, βi ≡ 0. We conclude that lim infk→∞ β(k)i ≥
βi = 0, since β
(k)
i ∈ {0, 1}.
In either one of the above (complementary) cases (a), (b)
or (c), we have that lim infk→∞ β
(k)
i ≥ βi. Following the
exact same reasoning, and the continuity of the mapping
Ki(α, ·) with respect to the aspiration level ρi, we also derive
that lim infk→∞ γ
(k)
i ≥ γi (for all the corresponding (a), (b)
and (c) cases).
Finally, due to the continuity of the perturbed strategy
vector x˜iαi with respect to xiαi , we conclude that for any
sequence z(k) → z,
lim inf
k→∞
Pλ(z
(k), O) ≥ Pλ(z,O).
By [16, Proposition 7.2.1], we conclude that Pλ satisfies the
weak-Feller property.
The above derivation can be generalized to any selection
probability function f(xiαi) in the place of x˜iαi , provided
that it is a continuous function. Thus, the proof for the
unperturbed process P follows the exact same reasoning by
simply setting f(xiαi) = xiαi .
The measure µλ ∈ P(Z) is called an invariant probability
measure (i.p.m.) for Pλ if
(µλPλ)(A)
.
=
∫
Z
µλ(dz)Pλ(z,A) = µλ(A), A ∈ B(Z).
Since Z defines a locally compact separable metric space and
P , Pλ satisfy the weak-Feller property, they both admit an
i.p.m., denoted µ and µλ, respectively [16, Theorem 7.2.3].
We would like to characterize the stochastically stable
states z ∈ Z of Pλ, that is any state z ∈ Z for which
any collection of i.p.m. {µλ ∈ P(Z) : µλPλ = µλ, λ > 0}
satisfies lim infλ→0 µλ(z) > 0. As the forthcoming analysis
will show, the stochastically stable states will be a subset of
the set of pure strategy states (p.s.s.) defined as follows:
Definition 4.1 (Pure Strategy State): A pure strategy state
is a state s = (α, x, ρ) ∈ Z such that for all i ∈ I, xi = eαi
and ρi = ui(α), i.e., xi coincides with the vertex of the
probability simplex ∆(|Ai|) which assigns probability 1 to
action αi, and ρi coincides with the utility of agent i under
action profile α.
We will denote the set of pure strategy states by S. Pure
strategy states that correspond to pure Nash equilibria, will
be referred to as pure Nash equilibrium states and will be
denoted by S∗. For any pure strategy state s∗ = (α∗, x∗, ρ∗),
define the δ-neighborhood of s∗ as follows
Nδ(s∗) .=
{z = (α, x, ρ) ∈ Z : α = α∗ , |x− x∗| < δ , |ρ− ρ∗| < δ}.
Theorem 4.1 (Stochastic Stability): In any coordination
game (Definition 2.2) and under the aspiration-based per-
turbed learning automata of Table II (APLA), there exists a
unique probability vector pi = (pi1, ..., pi|S∗|) such that, for
any collection of i.p.m.’s {µλ ∈ P(Z) : µλPλ = µλ, λ > 0},
(a) limλ↓0 µλ(·) = µˆ(·) .=
∑
s∈S∗ pisδs(·), where conver-
gence is in the weak sense.
(b) The probability vector pi is an invariant distribution of
the (finite-state) Markov process Pˆ , such that, for any
s, s′ ∈ S∗,
Pˆss′
.
= lim
t→∞QP
t(s,Nδ(s′)), (9)
for any δ > 0 sufficiently small, where Q is the t.p.f.
corresponding to at least two players trembling (i.e.,
following the uniform distribution of (4)).
Theorem 4.1 establishes weak convergence of the i.p.m. of
Pλ with the invariant distribution of a finite Markov chain Pˆ ,
whose support is on the set of pure Nash equilibrium states.
Thus, from the ergodicity of µλ, we have that the expected
percentage of time that the process spends in any O ∈ B(Z)
such that ∂O ∩ S∗ 6= ∅ is given by µˆ(O) as h, λ ↓ 0 and
time increases, i.e.,
lim
h,λ↓0
(
lim
t→∞
1
t
t−1∑
k=0
P kλ (x,O)
)
= µˆ(O) .
The methodology for assessing which Nash equilibria are
stochastically stable will follow in the forthcoming Sec-
tion VI.
V. TECHNICAL DERIVATION
In this section, we provide the main steps for the proof
of Theorem 4.1. We begin by investigating the asymptotic
behavior of the unperturbed process P , and then we charac-
terize the i.p.m. of the perturbed process with respect to the
pure Nash equilibrium states S∗.
A. Unperturbed Process
Recall that the unperturbed process with t.p.f. P has been
defined such that at most one agent may tremble. We first
present two technical lemmas that will help us identify the
behavior of the unperturbed process.
Let τ(D) denote the first hitting time of the unperturbed
process to a set D ⊂ B(Z).
For some action profile α ∈ A and δ > 0, define the set:
Dδ(α)
.
= {z ∈ Z : ρi ≤ ui(α) + δ , xiαi > 0 ,∀i ∈ I}.
The set Dδ(α) ⊂ B(Z), corresponds to any state z ∈ Z at
which the aspiration level is below ui(α)+δ for some given
α ∈ A and δ > 0. Define also the event
Γδ,t
.
= {∃α ∈ A : τ(Dδ(α)) < t},
i.e., the event Γt corresponds to the case that the process
first reaches Dδ(α) for some action profile α before time t.
The first lemma states that, for any initial state z, at least
one Γδ,t occurs for some t > 0.
Lemma 5.1: For any δ > 0, and any z = (α, x, ρ) ∈ Z ,
Pz[Γδ,∞] = 1.
Proof: Consider any initial state z = (·, x(0), ρ(0)).
Since xi ∈ Xi ≡ ∆ (|Ai|), there exists an action profile
α ∈ A such that xiαi(0) > 0 for all i ∈ I. For some
δ > 0, define T (δ) to be the maximum (with respect to A)
number of iterations required for the aspiration level profile
ρ to drop from ρ (i.e., its maximum value) to Dδ(α), when
playing only action profile α. Let also Dδ(α)c denote the
complement of Dδ(α). We will first consider the case that
the initial state z ∈ Dδ(α)c. In this case, we have:
Pz[τ(Dδ(α)) <∞]
≥ Pz[α(t) = α , ∀t ≤ T (δ)|ρi(0) = ρ ,∀i]
≥
T (δ)∏
k=1
(1− λ)
n∏
i=1
xiαi(0)
.
= κ(λ).
The first inequality results from the fact that one possible
sample path that reaches Dδ(α) corresponds to playing
action α continuously, and the probability of this path is
smaller when we start from ρ. The second inequality results
from the fact that, under the unperturbed process P , only
one agent may tremble at any given time. Finally, note that
by selecting action α continuously for T (δ) steps, xiαi(t) ≥
xiαi(0) for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T (δ). By selecting ν > 0 (according
to Property 3.1), T (δ) is finite, and κ(λ) > 0. Finally, note
that if, instead, z ∈ Dδ(α), then Pz[τ(Dδ(α)) < ∞] = 1.
Thus, we conclude that
inf
z
Pz[τ(Dδ(α)) <∞] ≥ κ(λ) > 0.
For some t > T (δ), let us define the event:
Cδ,t
.
= {∃k ≤ t, α′ ∈ A : α(τ) = α′ ,
∀τ : k < τ ≤ k + T (δ) ≤ t}.
In other words, Cδ,t corresponds to the event that some
action profile α′ has been selected (continuously) for at
least T (δ) times before time t. Note that Cδ,t ⊆ Cδ,t+1.
Furthermore, infz Pz[Cδ,t+T (δ)|Ccδ,t] = κ(λ) > 0. Thus,
from the counterpart of the Borel-Cantelli Lemma (cf., [17,
Lemma 1]), and continuity from below, we conclude that
infz Pz[Cδ,∞] = 1, i.e., the probability that at least one Cδ,t
occurs, starting from any z, is one. Given that Cδ,t ⊆ Γδ,t
for any t, the conclusion follows.
The second lemma states that the unperturbed process
reaches (infinitely often) a state at which the aspiration level
is below the utility level of a Nash equilibrium and its
strategy assigns positive probability to it. Define the event:
Γ∗t
.
= {∃α∗ ∈ A∗ : τ(D0(α∗)) < t},
which corresponds to the case that the aspiration level is
below the utility level of a Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 5.2: For any z = (α, x, ρ) ∈ Z , Pz[Γ∗∞] = 1.
Proof: By Lemma 5.1, there exists a subsequence {tk}
such that Z(tk) ∈ Dδ(α(k)) for some action profile α(k) ∈
A. We distinguish the following (complementary) cases.
(a) α(k) ∈ A∗. In this case, α(k) corresponds to a pure
Nash equilibrium. By definition of a coordination game, there
exists agent i∗ = i∗(α(k)) and α˜i∗ that makes every other
agent worse off. By selecting δ = δ(ν) > 0 sufficiently
small, such drop in the performance brings the aspiration
level of every agent strictly below ui(α(k)). Formally, select
δ < δ∗, where
δ∗ .=
ν
ν + 1
inf
α∗∈A∗
inf
j∈I
|uj(α˜i∗(α∗), α∗−i)− uj(α∗))| > 0.
Then,
Pz[Z(tk + 1) ∈ D0(α∗)|Z(tk) ∈ Dδ(α(k))]
≥ λ∣∣Ai∗(α(k))∣∣ .= γ1(λ),
which is strictly positive since λ > 0.
(b) α(k) ∈ A\A∗. In this case, α(k) corresponds to an
action profile that is not a Nash equilibrium. According
to the definition of a coordination game, there exists a
finite sequence of action profiles starting from α, namely
α(0), α(1), ..., α(L), such that: a) α(0) = α, b) α(L) ∈ A∗
and c) for each ` = 1, ..., L, there exists i such that α(`+1)i ∈
BRi(α
(`)) satisfies condition (2). Thus, there exists finite
integer L > 0, such that
Pz[Z(tk + L) ∈ D0(α∗)|Z(tk) ∈ Dδ(α(k))]
≥
L∏
`=1
λ
|A`|
∏
i∈I\`
xiα(`)(tk + `)
.
= γ2(λ, ).
Along this sequence of best responses there is no agent that
gets worse off. Thus, along this sample path, xiα(`) increases
with an order of  (and independent of h) for every agent i.
Thus, γ2(λ, ) > 0.
We can define a subsequence {tk(m)}m, that takes into
account the size of L, such that Γtk(m) ⊆ Γtk(m+1) and
inf
z
Pz[Γtk(m+1) |Γctk(m) ] ≥ min{γ1, γ2} > 0.
Thus, the conclusion follows from the counterpart of the
Borel-Cantelli Lemma (cf., [17, Lemma 1]).
Next, we will use Lemma 5.2 to show that the process will
reach a δ-neighborhood of a pure Nash equilibrium infinitely
often with probability one.
For any δ > 0, define the event:
Bδ,t
.
= {∃s∗ ∈ S∗ : τ(Nδ(s∗)) < t} .
In other words, Bδ,t corresponds to the event that the
unperturbed process has reached a δ-neighborhood of a pure
Nash equilibrium state before time instance t.
Proposition 5.1: For any δ > 0 and any initial state z =
(α, x, ρ) ∈ Z , Pz[Bδ,∞] = 1.
Proof: By Lemma 5.2, there exists a subsequence {tk}
such that Z(tk) ∈ D0(α(k)) for some pure Nash equilibrium
α(k) ∈ A∗. Let us consider one such tk, for some k. Let
us also consider a sample path of the unperturbed process,
where action α(k) is played continuously until Nδ(s(k)) is
reached, where s(k) is the pure strategy state corresponding
to action profile α(k). Let T ∗(δ) be the maximum (with
respect to A) number of steps required for the process to
reach Nδ(s(k)) when playing action profile α(k) continu-
ously. Proposition 4.1 in [8] shows that such sample path
occurs with strictly positive probability (of order of ), say
γ(). Then,
Pz[Bδ,tk+T∗(δ)|Z(tk) ∈ D0(α(k))] ≥ γ() > 0.
We can define a subsequence {tk(m)} such that tk(m+1) ≥
tk(m) + T
∗(δ), such that Bδ,tk(m) ⊆ Bδ,tk(m+1) and
inf
z
Pz[Bδ,tk(m+1) |Bcδ,tk(m) ] ≥ γ() > 0.
Thus, from the counterpart of the Borel-Cantelli Lemma
(cf., [17, Lemma 1]), we conclude that Pz[Bδ,∞] = 1.
Proposition 5.1 states that the unperturbed process will
reach a δ-neighborhood of a Nash equilibrium infinitely often
with probability one. Note that this derivation is independent
of the size of h and λ.
Proposition 5.2 (Limiting t.p.f. of unperturbed process):
Let µ denote an i.p.m. of P . Then, there exists a t.p.f. Π on
Z ×B(Z) with the following properties:
(a) for µ-a.e. z ∈ Z , Π(z, ·) is an i.p.m. for P ;
(b) for all f ∈ Cb(Z), limt→∞ ‖P tf −Πf‖∞ = 0;
(c) µ is an i.p.m. for Π;
(d) the support1 of Π is on S∗ for all z ∈ Z .
Proof: The state space Z is a locally compact separable
metric space and the t.p.f. of the unperturbed process P
admits an i.p.m. due to the weak-Feller property. Thus, state-
ments (a), (b) and (c) follow directly from [16, Theorem 5.2.2
(a), (b), (e)].
(d) Let us assume that the support of Π includes points
in Z other than the pure Nash equilibrium states in S∗.
Then, there exists an open set O ∈ B(Z) such that
O ∩ S∗ = ∅ and Π(z∗, O) > 0 for some z∗ ∈ Z .
According to (b), P t converges weakly to Π. Thus, from the
Portmanteau theorem (cf., [16, Theorem 1.4.16]), we have
that lim inft→∞ P t(z∗, O) ≥ Π(z∗, O) > 0. However, this
contradicts Proposition 5.1.
Proposition 5.2 states that the limiting unperturbed t.p.f.
converges weakly to a t.p.f. Π which accepts the same
invariant probability measure as P . Furthermore, the support
of Π is the set of pure Nash equilibrium states in S∗. This is
a rather handy property, since the limiting perturbed process
can also be “related” (in a weak-convergence sense) to the
t.p.f. Π, as it will be shown in the following section.
B. Invariant probability measure (i.p.m.) of perturbed pro-
cess
Note that the t.p.f. of the perturbed process can be decom-
posed as follows:
Pλ = (1− ϕ(λ))P + ϕ(λ)Q (10)
where Q is the t.p.f. of the one-step process where at least
two agents tremble simultaneously, i.e., they play an action
1The support of a measure µ on Z is the unique closed set F ⊂ B(Z)
such that µ(Z\F ) = 0 and µ(F ∩ O) > 0 for every open set O ⊂ Z
such that F ∩O 6= ∅.
uniformly at random. Note that
1− ϕ(λ) = (1− λ)n + nλ(1− λ)n−1
is the probability that at most one agent trembles. It is
straightforward to check that ϕ(λ)→ 0 as λ ↓ 0.
Define also the infinite-step t.p.f. when trembling only at
the first step (briefly, lifted t.p.f.) as follows:
PLλ
.
= ϕ(λ)
∞∑
t=0
(1− ϕ(λ))tQP t = QRλ (11)
where Rλ
.
= ϕ(λ)
∑∞
t=0(1−ϕ(λ))tP t, i.e., Rλ corresponds
to the resolvent t.p.f.
In the following proposition, we establish weak-
convergence of the lifted t.p.f. PLλ with QΠ as λ ↓ 0, which
will further allow for an explicit characterization of the weak
limit points of the i.p.m. of Pλ.
Proposition 5.3 (i.p.m. of perturbed process): The
following hold:
(a) For f ∈ Cb(Z), limλ→0 ‖Rλf −Πf‖∞ = 0.
(b) For f ∈ Cb(Z), limλ→0 ‖PLλ f −QΠf‖∞ = 0.
(c) Any invariant distribution µλ of Pλ is also an invariant
distribution of PLλ .
(d) Any weak limit point in P(Z) of µλ, as λ→ 0, is an
i.p.m. of QΠ.
Proof: The proof follows the exact same reasoning with
the proof of [8, Proposition 4.3].
Proposition 5.3 establishes convergence (in a weak sense)
of the i.p.m. µλ of the perturbed process to an i.p.m. of QΠ.
In the following section, this convergence result will allow
for a more explicit characterization of µλ as λ ↓ 0.
C. Equivalent finite-state Markov process
Define the finite-state Markov process Pˆ as in (9).
Proposition 5.4 (Unique i.p.m. of QΠ): There exists a
unique i.p.m. µˆ of QΠ. It satisfies
µˆ(·) =
∑
s∈S∗
pisδs(·) (12)
for some constants pis ≥ 0, s ∈ S∗. Moreover, pi =
(pi1, ..., pi|S|) is an invariant distribution of Pˆ , i.e., pi = piPˆ .
Proof: From Proposition 5.2(d), we know that, the
support of Π is the set of pure Nash equilibrium states S∗.
Thus, the support of QΠ is also on S∗. From Proposition 5.3,
we know that QΠ admits an i.p.m., say µˆ, whose support is
also S∗. Thus, µˆ admits the form of (12), for some constants
pis ≥ 0, s ∈ S∗.
For any two distinct s, s′ ∈ S∗, note that Nδ(s′), δ > 0, is
a continuity set of QΠ(s, ·), i.e., QΠ(s, ∂Nδ(s′)) = 0. Thus,
from Portmanteau theorem, given that QP t ⇒ QΠ,
QΠ(s,Nδ(s′)) = lim
t→∞QP
t(s,Nδ(s′)) = Pˆss′ .
If we also define pis
.
= µˆ(Nδ(s)), then
pis′ = µˆ(Nδ(s′)) =
∑
s∈S
pisQΠ(s,Nδ(s′)) =
∑
s∈S
pisPˆss′ ,
which shows that pi is an invariant distribution of Pˆ , i.e.,
pi = piPˆ .
It remains to establish uniqueness of the invariant distribu-
tion of QΠ. Note that the set S∗ of pure Nash equilibrium
states states is isomorphic with the set A∗ of pure Nash
equilibrium profiles. If two or more agents tremble simul-
taneously (as t.p.f. Q dictates), then all other pure Nash
equilibrium profiles in A∗ have positive probability of being
reached (due to the fact that h > 0), i.e., QΠ(α, α′) > 0 for
all α′ ∈ A∗ and i ∈ I. It follows by Proposition 5.1 that
QΠ(α, α′) > 0 for all α′ ∈ A∗ and i ∈ I. Finite induction
then shows that (QΠ)n(α, α′) > 0 for all α, α′ ∈ A∗. It
follows that if we restrict the domain of QΠ to S∗, it defines
an irreducible stochastic matrix. Therefore, QΠ has a unique
i.p.m.
D. Proof of Theorem 4.1
Theorem 4.1(a)–(b) is a direct implication of Proposi-
tions 5.3–5.4.
VI. CONVERGENCE TO EFFICIENT OUTCOMES
A. Payoff-dominant states
According to Theorem 4.1, the stochastically stable states
is a subset of the set of pure Nash equilibrium states. We
may further refine the set of stochastically stable states
if we introduce additional structural constraints. One such
constraint is the existence of a payoff-dominant set of action
profiles.
Definition 6.1 (Payoff-dominant states): The set of
payoff-dominant states, denoted by S ⊆ S∗, is such that, for
any s∗ = (α∗, x∗, ρ∗) ∈ S and any s = (α, x, ρ) ∈ S∗\S,
ui(α
∗) > ui(α), for all i ∈ I.
Note that the set of payoff-dominant states may not be
empty in a coordination game of Definition 2.2, since the
set of pure Nash equilibrium states is not empty. However,
it might be the case that S ≡ S∗.
Proposition 6.1: Consider a coordination game of Defini-
tion 2.2, and let every agent implement the learning dynamics
of Table II with sufficiently small  > 0 such that ui(α) < 1
for all i and α ∈ A. Then,
lim
h,λ↓0
µλ(S) = 1. (13)
Proof: (sketch) According to Theorem 4.1, we have
limλ↓0 µλ(S) = µˆ(S). Thus, it is sufficient that we inves-
tigate the limit of µˆ(S) as h ↓ 0. For any two pure Nash
equilibrium states s∗ ∈ S and s ∈ S∗\S, and for any δ > 0
QΠ(s∗,Nδ(s)) is scaled by h (since the utility received
under s is strictly less than the utility received under s∗
for all agents). The conclusion follows by taking the limit as
h ↓ 0.
B. Simulation study
We consider the Stag-Hunt coordination game of Table I
where agents implement the APLA dynamics of Table II
with  = 0.0001, ν = 0.001, λ = 0.01 and h = 0.01. The
response of the aspiration-based reinforcement learning is
shown in Figure 2, while the corresponding response under
standard perturbed learning automata (i.e., for h ≡ 1), is
shown in Figure 1. It is evident that under standard perturbed
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Fig. 1. Response of standard perturbed learning automata (PLA) (h ≡ 1).
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Fig. 2. Response of aspiration-based perturbed learning automata (APLA)
(small h > 0).
learning automata, the risk-dominant equilibrium, which
corresponds to the action profile (B,B) is the stochastically-
stable state. On the other hand, Figure 2 demonstrates that
the payoff-dominant equilibrium (which corresponds to the
action profile (A,A)) is the stochastically-stable state under
APLA, which verifies the conclusion of Proposition 6.1.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper introduced a novel learning automata dynam-
ics, namely aspiration-based perturbed learning automata
(APLA). Contrary to standard perturbed learning automata,
actions are reinforced based on both repeated selection and
their satisfaction levels. This modification, that is solely
based on local information available to each agent (i.e.,
its own utility function), is able to alter the stochasti-
cally stability properties of standard learning automata in
strategic-form games. In particular, the payoff-dominant
(pure) Nash equilibrium states become the only stochastically
stable states. This overcomes several limitations observed
in reinforcement-based learning dynamics (e.g., discrete-
time replicator dynamics or learning-automata) where risk-
dominant pure Nash equilibria can be the only stochastically
stable outcomes.
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